4/12/2010
Fully Involved Motorhome
Came across this earlier today. I saw the smoke while heading east on the 101. It looked like whatever it was was out as the smoke was going away. As I was getting closer the smoke picked up again and I came upon this. I pulled off the road and filmed what I could, but had to leave.
3/25/2010
First Alarm Apartment Fire 37th st and Earl
First Alarm Apartment fire near 37th street and Earl in Phoenix, AZ. Started before 15:17 as a 3n1 Apartment fire, at around 15:30 as I arrived it went to a 1st alarm. This is as close as I could get without having to get by the cops. Station's involved 5, 11, 12, 13, and 61. Main fire was in a shed in the southwest corner of the complex surrounded by cinder block walls.
2/07/2010
3 in 1 Apartment fire 945 S. 40th st.
Video by Mike
Well after a long dry spell I finally have something to blog about. I have been very busy and have not been able to monitor my scanner during working hours. So I have been missing a lot of calls, plus the few calls I have heard, I could not go to because of my job.
Today after a day out with my brothers we were on our way home when I heard a call for an apartment fire. We were at 32nd st. and the 202 and so only had to go about 2 miles to get there. But we had to wait for some dawdling pedestrians to cross the street.
When we arrived the apartment had flames shooting out the windows but before I could get some pictures they had them knocked down.
At one point for no apparent reason they directed a fog stream of foam out the window and soaked all the onlookers nearby (missed those pics as well).
So here is some of what I got.
11/27/2009
7/27/2009
News Chopper Crash Final report released
The final Report for the mid air collision between KTVK Channel 3 and KNXV Channel 15 news has been released. It can be found here. Both Pilots are listed as being at fault. Which is what I expected.
The report is very detailed but tends to repeat itself.
Here are the summary findings:
"1. The pilots of the channel 3 and 15 helicopters were properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable Federal regulations.
2. Both helicopters were properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with Federal regulations.
3. The recovered components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures.
4. Weather was not a factor in this accident, and sun glare would not have interfered with the pilots ability to detect and track other helicopters over the pursuit scene.
5. The channel 15 pilots color vision deficiency was not a factor in this accident.
6. The channel 3 and 15 helicopters collided because one or both pilots lost awareness of the other helicopters position.
7. The lack of available information regarding the helicopters movements and positions precluded investigators from determining precisely the events that transpired before and at the time of the collision.
8. The channel 3 and 15 pilots reporting and visual tracking duties immediately before the collision likely precluded them from recognizing the proximity of their helicopters at that time.
9. This accident demonstrates the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept for reliably ensuring separation of aircraft during high-density traffic operations, especially when the pilot is conducting other nonflying duties as part of the operation.
10. A high-visibility paint scheme on the helicopters? main rotor blades or high-visibility anticollision lights could have facilitated the detection of the impending collision risk.
11. A traffic advisory system would enhance an electronic news gathering (ENG) pilot's capability to detect other aircraft operating in the same area by providing aural annunciations and visual displays of the traffic, and a system designed specifically for helicopters could help eliminate the nuisance warnings that ENG pilots can receive when other aircraft are operating near the systems alerting envelope.
12. Annual meetings with local electronic news gathering (ENG) helicopter and local Federal Aviation Administration personnel would help improve the safety of ENG operations by facilitating a proactive exchange of information among the participants.
13. Best practice guidelines would provide electronic news gathering pilots with practical knowledge to apply during these operations.
14. Recorder systems that captured cockpit audio, images, and parametric data would have significantly aided investigators in determining the circumstances that led to this accident."
And Probable Cause:
"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was both pilots ‟failure to see and avoid the other helicopter. Contributing to this failure was the pilots‟ responsibility to perform reporting and visual tracking duties to support their station's electronic news gathering (ENG) operation. Contributing to the accident was the lack of formal procedures for Phoenix-area ENG pilots to follow regarding the conduct of these operations."
Near the end of the document is transcriptions from the cockpit voice recorders starting at page 47.
A re-creation of the crash can be seen in the 2 videos below (not official).
The report is very detailed but tends to repeat itself.
Here are the summary findings:
"1. The pilots of the channel 3 and 15 helicopters were properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable Federal regulations.
2. Both helicopters were properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with Federal regulations.
3. The recovered components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures.
4. Weather was not a factor in this accident, and sun glare would not have interfered with the pilots ability to detect and track other helicopters over the pursuit scene.
5. The channel 15 pilots color vision deficiency was not a factor in this accident.
6. The channel 3 and 15 helicopters collided because one or both pilots lost awareness of the other helicopters position.
7. The lack of available information regarding the helicopters movements and positions precluded investigators from determining precisely the events that transpired before and at the time of the collision.
8. The channel 3 and 15 pilots reporting and visual tracking duties immediately before the collision likely precluded them from recognizing the proximity of their helicopters at that time.
9. This accident demonstrates the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept for reliably ensuring separation of aircraft during high-density traffic operations, especially when the pilot is conducting other nonflying duties as part of the operation.
10. A high-visibility paint scheme on the helicopters? main rotor blades or high-visibility anticollision lights could have facilitated the detection of the impending collision risk.
11. A traffic advisory system would enhance an electronic news gathering (ENG) pilot's capability to detect other aircraft operating in the same area by providing aural annunciations and visual displays of the traffic, and a system designed specifically for helicopters could help eliminate the nuisance warnings that ENG pilots can receive when other aircraft are operating near the systems alerting envelope.
12. Annual meetings with local electronic news gathering (ENG) helicopter and local Federal Aviation Administration personnel would help improve the safety of ENG operations by facilitating a proactive exchange of information among the participants.
13. Best practice guidelines would provide electronic news gathering pilots with practical knowledge to apply during these operations.
14. Recorder systems that captured cockpit audio, images, and parametric data would have significantly aided investigators in determining the circumstances that led to this accident."
And Probable Cause:
"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was both pilots ‟failure to see and avoid the other helicopter. Contributing to this failure was the pilots‟ responsibility to perform reporting and visual tracking duties to support their station's electronic news gathering (ENG) operation. Contributing to the accident was the lack of formal procedures for Phoenix-area ENG pilots to follow regarding the conduct of these operations."
Near the end of the document is transcriptions from the cockpit voice recorders starting at page 47.
A re-creation of the crash can be seen in the 2 videos below (not official).
7/25/2009
9 Months of Incidents
This is a map of incidents for a Tempe Fire station for a 9 month period. There were more than 1600 calls, that comes to about 7 calls per day.
More that 90% are aid calls. They shouldn't call it the "Fire Department" it should be called the "Aid Department".
More that 90% are aid calls. They shouldn't call it the "Fire Department" it should be called the "Aid Department".
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